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Abstract 
Drawing from the centrality of the quality of Governance in promoting and sustaining nationhood and by virtue 
of the fact that most drivers of conflicts in society, such as greed and grievances are discovered to be anchored 
on the nature of the relationship between the state and society., This paper therefore, adopt the social identity 
theory to analyses the socio-political factors which pave the way for the emergence of Boko Haram and ISIS in 
Nigeria and Iraq respectively. The paper adopt a content analysis by extensively reviewing the findings of 
previous studies which have identified the drivers of conflicts in several context, as well as carrying an in-depth 
analysis of several researches on Governance reform with the view to strike a balance between the two. The 
article thus, conclude by arguing that only structural transformation of local Governance by emphasizing and 
entrenching inclusiveness, integration and effective local democracy can guarantee success in the fight against 
insurgence and domestic terrorism  in both countries. This is because all the models of radicalization into 
political violence implicitly acknowledged that crisis of legitimacy is the beginning of civil strife. 
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Introduction 
A very much acknowledged contributor to the persistence of conflict and war is state fragility, which has 
attracted significant academic consideration in the wake of the 'war on terrorism' as having ramifications not just 
for those residents who live in failing and failed states, but for whatever remains of the outside world also 
(Brinkerhoff, 2011). Fragile states can offer shelters for terrorists to lead operations that imperil the lives of 
peoples living far away from those nations. Fragile states have been alluded to as a 'sleeping giants' constituting 
a danger that requires coordinated and collaborative effort to dealt with (Bertocchi & Guerzoni, 2012). 
The contribution of state fragility in conflict and civil war has highlighted the significance of governance in 
building peace, seeking after state reconstruction and preventing the occurrence of conflict (Rocha Menocal, 
2011). While practitioners and researchers have produced substantial amount of information and experience-
based lessons for building governance in nations with working governments and relative security, the condition 
of theoretical and practical knowledge regarding  the building or reconstructing of effective governance structure 
in post-conflict and war-torn social settings is still in its earliest stages (Risse, 2013). 
Essentially all definitions of fragility in the literature see the serious absence of state capacity as well as the 
attendant consequence of ineffective service delivery as the epi-center of fragility. Numerous definitions 
additionally incorporate political instability (Olowu & Chanie, 2015), lack of political will‟ (Bertocchi & 
Guerzoni, 2011), lack of voice and accountability (Zürcher, 2012) and a deficit of legitimacy (Grävingholt, 
Ziaja, & Kreibaum 2011). All these attributes significantly affect state-society relations through decreasing 
capacity and legitimacy of the state across key areas and functions. 
 
Recently Nigeria has feature prominently among countries with some attributes of fragility and failure cheaply 
due to the persistent incidence of domestic terrorism and act of insurgency that have continue to give a negative 
impression of the Government capacity (Meagher, 2014). This paper therefore, attempts to provide a 
comparative analysis of how absence of good governance provides a fertile ground for the emergence and 
sustainability of terrorism in both Nigeria and Iraq by using the social identity theory. The rationale for making 
such comparison is twofold; firstly while the activities of the insurgence in both countries has strong connotation 
with the social identity theory base on religious inclination. The second, albeit more important is the fact that an 
extensive review of the key findings on drivers of violence shows that all these attributes are present in both 
countries. For instance Relative deprivation, horizontal inequality (Besancon, 2005), Ethnic/religious division, 
dominance, exclusion (Fearon & Laitin, 2003), Natural resource rents and unfairness (Tadjoeddin et al., 2003), 
Repressive, authoritarian government (Zartman, 1997), Unavailable, unresponsive, skewed public services(Vaux 
& Visman, 2005), Lack of security (Collier et al., 2003), Natural resource rents and ‘lootables’(Soysa & 
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Neumeyer, 2007), High unemployment (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004),  Poverty and weak/stagnant economic growth 
(Collier & Hoeffler, 2004). Couple with the fact that Countries highly depends on natural resources are identified 
as especially prone to risk of civil war (Caselli & Coleman, 2013; Rustad & Binningsbø, 2012 & Janus, 2012). 
 
The concept of Governance 
Peters (2011) sees governance as economic policy-making and implementation, the delivery of service and 
responsible utilization of public funds and of administrative power. Yet another definitions address how 
government associates with different segments and with citizens. For instance, Risse (2013) considers 
governance to 'relate to the capacity of government to evolve a productive, effective, and responsible public 
management mechanism which foster citizen’s inclusiveness and that which reinforces the democratic system of 
government'. 
 
Frenk, and Moon (2013) conceptualized it as ‘how institutions, rules and systems of the state executive, 
legislature, judiciary, and military operate at central and local level and how the state relates to individual 
citizens, civil society and the private sector’. Datta, (2013) view it as ‘the exercise of economic, political and 
administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels’ The last definitions unequivocally emphasize 
the connectivity between the political dimension of governance to with the technocratic components of 
macroeconomic management and the operational capacity of the public organization, which thus reflected in 
how governance is tended to in failed states. These integrative definitions describe how this paper treats 
governance. 
 
Theoretical framework 
Social Identity Theory 
In as much as no individual is an island, social identity theory holds that individuals determine who they are and 
to which social group they have a place by participating in a procedure of putting individuals, including oneself, 
into groups, a subjective affiliation, and inclination toward one's own particular group and its importance (Hogg 
& Terry, 2014).  To perfectly capture how the social identity works, require a comprehension of the concept of 
“belonging," which can be understood by analyzing the personality traits, orientation and perceptions, including 
cultural norms and behavioral attributed goals (Smith, 2014). These attribute plays significant role in explaining 
the feeling of belongings, the person who feels that the state is not receptive to their needs, particularly the basic 
security, which is freedom from need and fear, and may be compelled to searches out a substitute community 
(Zagefka, & Jamir, 2015). 
 
To this end, once individuals appraise the conditions of their lives, their surroundings, and themselves, from one 
perspective, and the group or movement they wish to join on the other, they tend to evolve the social attributes 
that would permit them to join such group officially (Smith, 2014). A social group, in this way, depends on three 
interconnected factors: An insecure situation, which empowers the group to show particular social qualities and 
to which the disappointed, oppressed individual can relate; a device to bond the masses with the group and Self-
interest (Zagefka, & Jamir, 2015). 
 
Regarding the political atmosphere, the social group needs to underline the way that the state failed to provide 
the individual the essential security that they needed and merited. Also, the state may even have indirectly 
contributed in undermining security by neglecting to deliver it, as well as participating in action that is unsafe to 
all or some portion of the populace, therefore paving the way for the affected citizens to search for succor 
elsewhere. The group may likely capitalize on an existing sense of insecurity by raising a false alarm thereby 
portraying the scenario in a specific light as an approach to gain the support of individuals who might as of now 
share some of its perspectives and by elevating the group's capacity to manage those problems, along these lines 
underlining the group's quality and value. The test for contending social groups is showing to present and 
potential supporters that the group is adequately sufficiently effective to concentrate concessions from 
established political actors, who might just offer concessions as a component of a bargaining procedure with the 
individuals who represent a danger to them and to the state itself. Accordingly, a social group needs a bond to 
unify its individuals together and guarantee an enduring supply of newcomers, as the group will take part in 
exercises that could thin its positions in somehow (Zagefka, & Jamir, 2015). 
 
Religion is an exceptionally powerful bond, particularly in times of social emergency that regularly happen when 
insecurity flourishes, which pave the way for the promoter of the religion to offer a radical interpretation that 
underlines individuals' sentiments of alienation. it is imperative to note that, religion has a strong tendency for 
identity cementation as it establishes the base for a message that addresses the spiritual and physical worlds 
(Cote & Levine, 2014). 
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The third component in the process is the group's self-interest the absolute necessity to act to draw in support and 
underlining the group's distinctiveness from possible competitors. Imperative here is that insurgence 
organizations are the same as all other groups in that they also seek to survive (Zagefka, & Jamir, 2015) It is thus 
precisely not the case that religious extremism feeds religiously inspired terrorism out of lack of awareness; it is 
instead a profoundly objective decision, and violence plays a key part in establishing the conditions that 
encourage the rise of social group. 
 
When all the three pillars above are view from the parlance of the economics of religion, it thus provides insight 
into the religious-based social group. The economics of religion recognizes the presence of two groups: religious 
producers and religious consumers, with the previous needing to sell an item specifically a perspective that they 
trust the former will acknowledge. For this transaction to succeed, in any case, the religious producers require 
conditions that underscore their usefulness and even necessity for individuals (Mitchell, 2013). 
  
Relevance of Identity theory to Nigeria and Iraq situations 
In sum, while applying the social group identity theory  to ISIS it becomes clear that the organization in Iraq 
seeks to make an insecure situation, either through its own particular brutal actions or in fostering strife with 
state powers.  By narrowing the marketplace of religion, ideas, and in particular, identities, ISIS then exploits the 
situation by guaranteeing that if one follows its motivation, security physical, economic, social, social, and 
religious will surely take after. This can best be infer from its 16-point report, published soon after it assumed 
control Mosul, which proclaimed, "Individuals attempted secular forms of government: republic, Baathist, 
Safavids.It tormented you. Presently is the ideal opportunity for an Islamic state (Cronin, 2015). A similar 
pattern of strategy is also adopted by the Boko haram in the north-eastern Nigeria, as the sect continue to create 
and unsecure environment in the region by unleashing violence on innocent citizens  which is stylistically geared 
toward exposing the weakness of the Government in providing adequate security for the citizenry (Omede & 
Omede, 2015). 
 
Poor Governance and the foundation of fragility in Iraq and Nigeria 
Iraq set out the starting conditions for the emergence of antinomian elements: increased sectarianism caused by 
insufficient valuation for the need to take part in social balancing to avoid grievances, the use of fierce tactics to 
venture power, and the capacity to draw in a surge of foreign fighters. In addition, the decades-long Saddam 
administration depended on trepidation to sustain itself as well as on an extensive patronage system, installed a 
society in which Iraqis instinctively consider having a connection with someone in power as the only means of 
benefiting from social security and  state resources (Bouillon, 2012).The political situation was undermined by 
widespread corruption among the decision makers, with contracts "won" by companies and individuals with 
close ties to senior Iraqi politicians. Today, Iraq's economic system is to a great extent a result of the successive 
orders issued by the CPA, whose policies advanced the conditions for corrupt practices that had long been 
uncontrolled (Dodge, 2013). 
 
For a considerable length of time, Iraqis depended on a system of patronage that saw millions just because they 
were members of the Ba'ath Party working for the state, giving them enormous power. The CPA policies, 
especially the decentralization project, served to highlight social identities, which implied that the patronage 
system changed just in so far as the fundamental identities supplanted the Ba'athists as the "connected" class. 
Instead of connecting social capital, which is the advancement of trust and collaboration among groups and it is 
an absolute necessity given Iraq's ethnic and social divisions that a system which advanced reinforced social 
capital or the advancement of trust and participation among groups evolved (Ali, 2013). 
 
It is in this manner no surprise that post-2003 Iraq displayed an apparent total absence of trust across each 
feature of society and a constantly changing relationship between tribes, gangs, and the insurgency of the day. 
As reconstruction accumulated force, those who had been avoided from the economic system under Saddam 
seized the opportunity that accompanied de-Ba'athification and the imperfect reconstruction process to demand 
their share.  Be that as it may, what distinguished these new actors from their predecessors was their willingness 
to take part in widespread violence (Muggah, 2013). The Syrian civil war shaped ISIS's tactics seizing territory, 
controlling smuggling routes, and working with nearby actors, most importantly it established a strong nexus 
with conflict in Iraq, where Sunnis clashed with the Maliki administration, with that of Syria, giving the Iraqi 
Sunni more support to strive for, an Islamic State of Sunnistan (Stigall, 2014). 
 
In Nigeria, the political landscape is epitomized by intense shortage of social infrastructure and basic amenities 
of life such as sounds roads, effective public transport system, power, water, schools and hospitals. As a rule, the 
state depicts a character average of a ruthless rentier states exemplified by clientelism, patrimonialism and 
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repression (Meagher, 2014). Public policies and decisions of political office holders mirror the interest of the few 
ruling class and always spill out from top to bottom. Politicians impose laws, public policies and decisions that 
have no bearing on for the genuine needs of citizens. Indeed, even so, execution of laws, public policies or 
decisions is selective, regularly as per the interests and intentions of degenerate politicians (Afeno, 2012).  
 
Democratic system in Nigeria obviously neglects the welfare of citizens. Nothing else best explains this situation 
than the issues of governance, where politicians have acted in manners that are without responsibility, 
transparency and responsiveness. Obviously, good governance can assure citizens of equivalent access to 
opportunities that ensure citizens self-completion. This absence of welfare, for which politicians have, best case 
scenario get to be expository about, is a shortage in Nigeria's democracy (Felix & Okumoko, 2014). This 
perpetually makes so many people to start questioning the capacity of liberal democracy in enhancing the living 
conditions of citizens (Omede & Omede, 2015). 
 
The above factors provide impetus for some aggrieved citizens to start challenging the legitimacy of the western 
political system especially where the fundamental values of democracy are weakly internalized. More so as 
coercion and warfare were instrumental in establishing the western political system in the north by the British 
which saw the forceful annihilation of the pre-colonial emirate system fashioned along the Islamic caliphate 
model of governance. So with the inability of the new system to achieve societal transformation the insurgence 
leaders capitalize on that to gather support for their separatist agenda. 
 
Governance as mitigating factors  
In order to appreciate the role of Governance in mitigating violence and insurgency, there is the need to 
understand the environment that breeds the insurgency in the first place. It is imperative to note that both Boko 
Haram and ISIS adopted a strategy similar to Maoist insurgency strategy which is a multi-facets approach that 
revolves around Environment, popular supports and organization, which requires gradual implementation 
through three important stages as follows: 
Organization-terrorism: which focus on political organization gaining popular supports through mobilization and 
spread of the insurgence ideology. 
Guerilla warfare: this involves the use of hit and run strategy which aims at demoralizing the government and 
creating and insecure environment. 
Mobile conventional warfare: this is the final stage characterized by offensive and open warfare between the 
Government force and the insurgence, involving capturing and overrunning territories (Ker, 2012). 
 
The Maoist strategy of insurgency warfare has been copied and used by both ISIS and Boko Haram with the 
view to overthrow their respective government. However, it is imperative to note that the key factor in the 
success of this strategy is popular supports both passive and active but most importantly the active one. This is 
because gaining and sustaining popular support ultimately determines the survival or eitherwise of the 
insurgency by providing able bodies, expertise, food, shelter and momentum to the insurgence without which 
surely insurgency will fail (Ker, 2012).   
 
The above highlight the role of Governance as the most crucial factor in the success or eitherwise of an 
insurgency, in the sense that supports and momentum enjoys by the group depend to a large extent on the 
manner in which Government respond to the plight of the masses (Olojo, 2013).   It is imperative to note that of 
all the considerable number of factors that have an impact on the advancement and result of rebellions, none is 
more essential than the government's reaction (Oyeniyi, 2010). Government reaction is the most vital element in 
light of the fact that the government has the capacity to rectify or refute the conditions that offered ascends to the 
revolt in the first place. What the government does or fails to do and how it performs has an immediate bearing 
on the strategy and method of fighting the insurgence adopt and the nature and degree of challenges they must 
cope with in the accomplishment of their mission. The more government reactions are informed, judicious, 
important, and prudent and disciplined, the more difficult it becomes for the insurgence. 
 
Conclusion and recommendations 
To this end, three important role needs to be play by the Government of both countries which involve: 
Reconstituting legitimacy 
Legitimacy depicts the citizen’s recognition of a governing regime as lawful and appropriate. Without some 
degree of legitimacy, states experience difficulties in operation and loss of legitimacy to some portion of the 
society is one of the most important contributors of state fragility and emergence of insurgence. Reconstituting 
legitimacy in states like Nigeria and Iraq involve ensuring grassroots support and participation, reducing 
imbalances, entrenching accountability, fighting corruption and conducting free and fair election. 
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Re-establishing security 
It is evident that the most important priority of both countries is on how to deal with the absence of security. This 
requires some vital actions such as military offensiveness, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.   
However the success of the last three heavily relies on the state capacity to restart the economy and create 
economic opportunities; reintegration will endure the likelihood of arm robbery and crime if economic 
opportunities are not present. Humanitarian and emergency relief is also very vital in order to address wrecked 
infrastructure and the internally displaced persons. 
 
Rebuilding effectiveness 
Reconstructing effectiveness has to do with the capacities and functions of the public sector. Good governance 
here means, for instance, satisfactory and working local democracy, broadly accessible health care and better 
schools, procurement of roads and transportation systems and consideration regarding social security nets. There 
is also the need to involve private sector in a kind of public-private partnership as this has proved to be very 
effective in infrastructural development in other countries.  
 
References 
Afeno, O. S. (2012). The Boko Haram uprising and insecurity in Nigeria: intelligence failure or bad 
governance? Conflict Trends, (1), 35-41. 
Ali, A. A. (2013). Displacement in a fragile Iraq. Forced Migration Review, 43, 58-59. 
Bertocchi, G., & Guerzoni, A. (2012). Growth, history, or institutions What explains state fragility in sub-
Saharan Africa?. Journal of Peace Research, 49(6), 769-783. 
Besançon, M. L. (2005). Relative resources: inequality in ethnic wars, revolutions, and genocides. Journal of 
Peace Research, 42(4), 393-415. 
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2011). Fragile states and development policy. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 9(3), 371-398. 
Bouillon, M. E. (2012). Iraq’s state-building enterprise: State fragility, state failure and a new social 
contract. International Journal of Contemporary Iraqi Studies, 6(3), 281-297. 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. (2011). State fragility and governance: Conflict mitigation and subnational 
perspectives. Development Policy Review, 29(2), 131-153. 
Caselli, F., & Coleman, W. J. (2013). On the theory of ethnic conflict. Journal of the European Economic 
Association, 11(s1), 161-192. 
Collier, P. (2003). Breaking the conflict trap: Civil war and development policy. World Bank Publications. 
Collier, P., & Hoeffler, A. (2004). Greed and grievance in civil war. Oxford economic papers, 56(4), 563-595. 
Cote, J. E., & Levine, C. G. (2014). Identity, formation, agency, and culture: A social psychological synthesis. 
Psychology Press. 
Cronin, A. K. (2015). ISIS Is Not a Terrorist Group. Foreign Affairs, 94(2), 87-98. 
Datta, K. (2013). Governance–A Simple Attempt to Measure. Economic Affairs,58(4s), 485-491. 
Dodge, T. (2013). State and society in Iraq ten years after regime change: the rise of a new 
authoritarianism. International Affairs, 89(2), 241-257. 
Fearon, J. D., & Laitin, D. D. (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American political science 
review, 97(01), 75-90. 
Felix, J. M., & Okumoko, T. P. (2014). Combating Insecurity in Nigeria: An Integrated Conflict Management 
Approach. Journal of Empirical Economics,3(4), 232-238. 
Frenk, J., & Moon, S. (2013). Governance challenges in global health. New England Journal of 
Medicine, 368(10), 936-942. 
Grävingholt, J., Ziaja, S., & Kreibaum, M. (2015). Disaggregating state fragility: a method to establish a 
multidimensional empirical typology. Third World Quarterly, 36(7), 1281-1298. 
Grimm, S., Lemay-Hébert, N., & Nay, O. (2014). ‘Fragile States’: introducing a political concept. Third World 
Quarterly, 35(2), 197-209. 
Hogg, M. A., & Terry, D. J. (Eds.). (2014). Social identity processes in organizational contexts. Psychology 
Press. 
Janus, T. (2012). Natural Resource Extraction and Civil Conflict. Journal of Development Economics, 97(1), 24-
31. 
Ker, I. (2012). Diagnostic Review of Insurgency in Nigeria: The Cultural Dimension. In The Eminent and Expert 
Working Group Meeting on National Counter Insurgency Strategy. 
Meagher, K. (2014). Beyond terror: addressing the Boko Haram challenge in Nigeria. 
Mitchell, M. C. (2013). Religion, identity and politics in Northern Ireland: boundaries of belonging and belief. 
Ashgate Publishing, Ltd. 
Muggah, R. (2013). Stabilization operations, security and development: States of fragility. Routledge 
Journal of Law, Policy and Globalization                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-3240 (Paper)  ISSN 2224-3259 (Online) 
Vol.45, 2016 
 
159 
Olojo, A. (2013). Nigeria’s Troubled North: Interrogating the Drivers of Public Support for Boko 
Haram. Retrieved August, 12, 2015. 
Olowu, D., & Chanie, P. (Eds.). (2015). State Fragility and State Building in Africa: Cases from Eastern and 
Southern Africa (Vol. 10). Springer. 
Omede, J., & Omede, A. A. (2015). Terrorism and Insecurity in Nigeria: Moral, Values and Religious Education 
as Panaceas. Journal of Education and Practice, 6(11), 120-126. 
Oyeniyi, A. B. (2010). Terrorism in Nigeria: Groups, Activities, and Politics. International Journal of Politics 
and Good Governance, 1(1), 1-16. 
Peters, B. G. (2011). Governance as political theory. Critical policy studies, 5(1), 63-72. 
Risse, T. (Ed.). (2013). Governance without a state?: policies and politics in areas of limited statehood. 
Columbia University Press. 
Rocha Menocal, A. (2011). State Building for Peace: a new paradigm for international engagement in post-
conflict fragile states? Third World Quarterly, 32(10), 1715-1736. 
Rustad, S. A., & Binningsbø, H. M. (2012). A price worth fighting for? Natural resources and conflict 
recurrence. Journal of Peace Research, 49(4), 531-546 
Smith, E. R. (2014). Social Identity and Social Emotions: Toward New Conceptualizations of Prejudice. Affect, 
cognition and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception, 297. 
Soysa, I. D., & Neumayer, E. (2007). Resource wealth and the risk of civil war onset: results from a new dataset 
of natural resource rents, 1970–1999.Conflict Management and Peace Science, 24(3), 201-218. 
Stigall, D. E. (2014). Global Brief (Definition): The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is... Global Brief, 61-
61 
Tadjoeddin, M. Z., Suharyo, W. I., & Mishra, S. (2003, March). Aspiration to inequality: regional disparity and 
centre-regional conflicts in Indonesia. In UNI/WIDER Project Conference on Spatial Inequality in Asia, 
Tokyo, Japan (pp. 28-29). 
Vaux, T., & Visman, E. (2005). Service delivery in countries emerging from conflict. DFID, London. 
Zagefka, H., & Jamir, L. (2015). Conflict, fear and social identity in Nagaland. Asian Journal of Social 
Psychology, 18(1), 43-51. 
Zartman, I. W. (1997). Governance as conflict management: Politics and violence in West Africa. Brookings 
Institute Press 
Zürcher, C. (2012). Conflict, state fragility and aid effectiveness: insights from Afghanistan. Conflict, Security & 
Development, 12(5), 461-480. 
 
